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INTRODUCTION
Are individual rights a danger to civil society? For almost forty years now,
critics of individual rights have argued that such rights damage, rather than
support, our national aspirations for equality, community, and democracy.
According to civic republicans, these rights insulate the rights holder from
communal criticism and legal recourse for the harmful consequences of his
rights-protected actions; atomize the rights holder’s sense of self, thus limiting
his circle of concerns to only his immediate entitlements; and isolate him from
the suffering and well-being of his neighbors and co-citizens.1 Critical legal
theorists add that, while an individual’s rights may enhance his liberty, they
may also compromise the equality of others and rhetorically legitimate – or
even valorize – the subordinating consequences of the individual’s rightsprotected behavior.2 According to both groups of critics, individual rights,
* Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law
Center.
1 See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013) (“In recent years, communitarian, civic republican,
and progressive thinkers and politicians have argued that our constitutional system takes
individual rights too seriously, to the neglect of responsibilities, virtues, and the common
good.” Id. at 1.); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991) (“No aspect of American rights discourse more tellingly illustrates the
isolated character of the rights-bearer than our protean right of privacy.” Id. at 48.);
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998) (“The priority of
the subject can only mean the priority of the individual, thus biasing the conception in favor
of individualistic values familiar to the liberal tradition. Justice only appears primary
because this individualism typically gives rise to conflicting claims.” Id. at 11.); Peter
Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves,
62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984) (“And by acting toward each other as if we believe all this and
that it must be believed, we coerce each other into remaining passive observers of our own
suspended experience, hiding together inside the anonymity of artificial self-presentations
that perpetually keep us locked in a state of mutual distance.” Id. at 1581.).
2 See Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 399-404 (1988) (“[A]
non-communitarian conception of rights must inevitably come to regard the quest for
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whatever good they do, also cast democratic processes and democratic
outcomes – including those that promote equality – as a source of oppression
from which individuals must be protected. These are now familiar charges,
made over the past half century by Marxists, legal realists, critical-rights
theorists, and civil republicans all. Individual rights, according to their critics,
come at some cost to equality, community, democracy, or all three.3 For all of
these reasons, on balance, individual rights harm rather than benefit civil
society, and do violence to our democratic aspirations.
In this Article I hope to complicate these familiar critiques of individual
rights. Throughout I contrast two emerging rights paradigms and their effects
on our shared civic life, institutions, and projects. The first paradigm is
exemplified most vividly by some of our most modern constitutional rights. I
argue that these rights do indeed pose a threat to civil society. The second
paradigm, however, is rooted not in the Constitution, but in our civil-rights
traditions. Our modern civil rights, in contrast to most modern constitutional
rights, not only support but are necessary for civil society. Consequently, civil
rights pose no threat to civil society, and indeed constitute its legal
architecture. I conclude that we should not respond to the critique of rights by
jettisoning rights or the idea of rights, but by refocusing and expanding upon
our civil-rights traditions.
In Part I of this Article I identify and criticize a cluster of constitutional
rights, which I argue do tremendous and generally unreckoned harm to civil
society, and do so for reasons poorly articulated in earlier critiques. At the
heart of the new paradigm of constitutional rights that I believe these rights
exemplify is a “right to exit.” On this conception of individual rights, a
constitutional right is a right to “opt out” of some central public or civic
project. This understanding of what it means to have a constitutional right hit
the scene a good two decades after civic republicans and critical legal theorists
mostly had formed their respective critiques of individual rights. Consequently,
such thinkers failed to incorporate the notion of constitutional rights into their
critiques. The particular exit rights that I enumerate – that is, the rights to exit
substantive equality itself as a threat to rights, and not as an indispensable foundation of true
liberty and autonomy.” Id. at 401-02.); Introduction: Revitalizing Rights, RIGHTS, at xi, xiii
(Robin West ed., 2001) (“Rights have constituted obstacles . . . to the creation or
maintenance of humanistic, egalitarian, diverse, environmentally healthy and just
communities.” Id. at xiii.); cf. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363,
1385-94 (1984) (“The distinction between negative and positive rights reflects and perhaps
is based on a fundamental aspect of our social life. We fear that others with whom we live
will act so as to crush our individuality, and thus we demand negative rights.” Id. at 1392.).
3 Horwitz, supra note 2, 396-97 (“History thus shows us that rights are a double-edged
sword, and for most of our constitutional history, in fact, a single-edged sword.”); Robin
West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118
YALE L.J. 1394, 1405-21 (2009) (“[A]pparent gains in justice wrought through legal change
are sometimes offset by what might be called the ‘legitimation costs’ of the same legal
breakthrough.” Id. at 1406.).
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from the benefits and responsibilities of public projects, including public
education, publicly funded policing, civil rights commitments, and public
health projects – harm civil society in profound ways not appreciated by rights
critics in the 1970s and 1980s. The harm these rights do, to borrow language
from the title of Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein’s recent book,4 has
turned out to be even worse than it might have seemed in the heyday of our
rights critiques. I urge a reinvigorated rights critique that centers on these new
rights and new harms.
In Part II I discuss a countertrend: the expansion of civil rights beyond those
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Some of our most newly created
civil rights, generally created by Congress and state legislatures rather than
announced by courts, in effect extend to individuals various rights to enter civil
society, or some civil project close to its core. I call these civil rights “rights to
enter” – these include, for example, the right to a high quality and public
education,5 the right to purchase health insurance at affordable costs,6 the right
to a safe home and neighborhood free of gun violence,7 the right to nurture a
newborn or sick family member while not losing one’s job,8 the right to marry
4

THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM
(2012).
5 As reflected, for example, in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (“The purpose
of this title is to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to
obtain a high-equality education . . . .” Id. § 1001, 115 Stat. at 1439); Race to the Top,
Notice of Proposed Priorities, 74 Fed. Reg. 37,804, 37,804 (July 29, 2009), which is funded
in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 1400514006, 123 Stat. 115, 282-84; as well as in numerous state constitutions, see, e.g., ARIZ.
CONST. art. XI, § 1, cl. A; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
In spite of the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate the case for a constitutional right to
education, it has often referred to education as one of the state’s central purposes, thus
effectively casting it as a civil right. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
(“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.”).
6 The Affordable Care Act rests squarely, if implicitly, on a civil right to health care. See
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28, and 42
U.S.C.); Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (2012); see Steven J.
Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991); Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111 (1991) (“No citizen shall be subject to
uncheckable violence by anyone other than the state . . . .” Id. at 129.).
8 The Family and Medical Leave Act implicitly recognizes such a right. See Family
Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 and 29 U.S.C.).
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whom one loves regardless of sex,9 and the right to work and school
environments free of discriminatory animus.10 All of these civil rights,
imperfectly recognized in various statutes, invite participation in some core
sphere of civil society: education, insurance markets, neighborhoods, family,
marriage, or employment. These civil “rights to enter,” which stand in contrast
to constitutional “rights to exit,” exemplify both an old idea that dates back to
the early days of the republic, and a new idea that invites participation in a
radically transformed civil society. Not only are these rights not harmful to
civil society, they are integral to it.
Now, what is the relation between these two kinds of individual rights?
Generally, civil rights to enter are clearly not buttressed by constitutional rights
to exit, and increasingly are threatened by them. First, both our historical and
more modern civil rights to enter civil society – the various civil rights won in
the nineteenth century by freed slaves and wives, and in the twentieth century
by racial and religious minorities; women; the disabled; the elderly; school
children; gay, lesbian and transgendered citizens; laborers; economically
struggling parents; and the victims of hate crimes and private and domestic
violence – are not constitutional rights at all, and for the most part the courts
have declared as much.11 Although there exists a civil right to these societal
benefits, there is no clearly defined constitutional right to an adequate public
education, to a police force, to some measure of health care, to be free of
private discrimination in employment, to safe and fairly remunerated labor, or
to help with child care while employed. All of these rights, however, are at
least arguably civil rights. And some of them are core civil rights. But
increasingly the Constitution not only fails to protect these civil rights but also
threatens to undermine them, insofar as it grants individuals and corporations
the right to exit precisely those civil projects and legal institutions that civil
rights seek to guarantee others the right to enter. Civil rights and constitutional
rights are thus decidedly not co-constitutive of a unified constitutional
tradition, or of an articulable American identity, or a distinctively American
conception of the nature of rights. Rather, civil rights and constitutional rights
are on a collision course.

9 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-20a (West Supp. 2013) (codifying the right to marriage
for opposite- and same-sex couples); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2012
& Supp. 2013) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (2012 & Supp. 2013) (same).
10 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sex in education programs that accept federal funds); id. tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e to 2000e-17 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in the workplace).
11 See, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756-70 (2005) (holding that there is
no constitutional right to a police force); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-203 (1989) (same); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (holding that there is no constitutional right to education); The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-14 (1883) (holding that there is no constitutional right to be
free from discrimination by private actors).
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In both Parts I suggest that the almost ten-year-old constitutionally
grounded, individual right to bear arms, particularly when combined with the
broadened understanding of self-defense embodied in “stand your ground”
laws, jointly constitute a paradigmatic, and maybe the paradigmatic, “exit
right.” By contrast, the civil rights to physical security, and to state protection
against private violence that interrupts it, are at least as old as the Constitution
itself, and exemplify the civil rights paradigm I try to describe: the right to
state protection against private violence is the quintessential and foundational
“right to enter.”12 I conclude with the observation that, while the constitutional
right to own and use a gun and the civil right to protection from the state
against private violence, are in obvious tension, the constitutional right to gun
ownership recognized by the Supreme Court does not necessarily foreclose the
possibility of a civil right to decent effective gun-control laws.13 Perhaps if we
could spark a renewed civil rights movement, aimed at legislative activism
rather than judicial activism, we might inspire a lawful and politically salient
civil response to the threats to our safety and the tears to our social fabric that
are occasioned by the Court’s newfound constitutional right to own and use
lethal weapons. The same may also be true more broadly. My general
conclusion is that the way to repair the damage done to civil society by
constitutional exit rights might be simply to reinvigorate our civil rights
agenda.
I.

RIGHTS TO EXIT

Over the last thirty years a fair number of the constitutional rights courts
articulated, litigants asserted, or scholars advocated, either in the Constitution
or in the law, are rights of individuals or corporations to opt out in some way
of obligations otherwise imposed on citizens, be it by democratically
authorized social or public projects, common law, intimate or private
associations, or social institutions. Such constitutional exit rights do not simply
expand individual liberty by recalibrating the boundary between the state’s

12

In his classic definition of civil rights contained in his essay, Rights of Man, Thomas
Paine identified the right to protection by the state against physical violence as the classic,
core instance of a civil right:
Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind
are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as
an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural
rights of others. Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a
member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation, some natural right preexisting in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in
all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and
protection.
THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 68 (John Seelye ed., Penguin Books 1984) (1791-92).
13 The Court in District of Columbia v. Heller explicitly observed the constitutionality of
a wide range of gun control measures, considerably more than we currently enjoy. District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008).
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police power and the individual’s sovereign sphere of action. Instead, they
provide the right to establish a separate sovereignty free of the influence or
power of the state. The right confers the power to exit some core goal, project,
or commitment of civil society.
The Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence is exemplary of
this trend, particularly its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller granting to
individuals a constitutional right to bear arms for in self-defense.14 It is easy to
lose track of how radically antiliberal such cases are. According to our entire
liberal tradition – including Hobbes,15 Locke,16 Rawls,17 and Nozick18 – as
well as the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause19
and the Enforcement Act of 1871,20 the simple yet powerful image of the state
as a watchman lies at the core of the social contract. In exchange for
relinquishing our natural rights to violent self-help, which is destructive of
communal life, the watchman promises to protect us and our property from
private violence. Without that social contract, “the life of man [is] nasty,
brutish, and short,”21 primarily due to the potential for unchecked lethal
violence of all upon all.22 By entering into the social contract, laying down
arms, and trusting the sovereign watchman to guard against private violence,
the individual loses liberty but gains security.
The individual retains, of course, carefully drawn rights of self-defense,
delineated in each state’s criminal code. Legal rights of self-defense predate
not just Heller, but the Second Amendment itself. But before Heller and prior
to the widespread enactment of “stand your ground” laws, those common law
rights were narrowly drawn precisely to prevent society from slipping into a
vengeful and revenge-driven Hobbesian state of nature. Only if an individual
reasonably believes that he is imminent danger of serious bodily harm and has
no opportunity to escape may he use force in self-defense – and even then, he
may only use force necessary for self-defense.23 Outside of these constrained
14

Id.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 92 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651).
16 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 70-71 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
Macmillian Publ’g Co. 1952) (1690).
17 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (1971).
18 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 23 (1974).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994); Heyman,
supra note 7.
20 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (2012).
21 HOBBES, supra note 15, at 89.
22 Id.; see also LOCKE, supra note 16, at 71 (“[M]en being partial to themselves, passion
and revenge is very apt to carry them too far and with too much heat in their own cases, as
well as negligence and unconcernedness to make them too remiss in other men’s.”).
23 For example, to justify a homicide on self-defense grounds in Maryland, the accused
must establish (1) that he had reasonable grounds to believe that he was in apparent
15
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and last-resort rights, the obligation and the power to protect the individual
against violence and theft are committed to the state. This is the essence of the
civil contract that underlies liberal society. As I discuss below, the
foundational civil right of the individual to look to the state for protection, as
well as the obligation of the state to provide such protection (often called the
first duty of the state24) are not just essential to, but constitutive of, civil
society.
Against this backdrop the right that the Court recognized in Heller is not just
a threat to the coherence and strength of a state’s capacity to protect
individuals against violence, but also threatens the contractual arrangement at
the heart of civil society. After Heller the individual may turn to the state for
protection against violence, but he has no obligation to do so. He may choose
instead to take up arms, stand his ground, and protect himself against such
violence. Under Heller he has a constitutional right to use lethal force and own
lethal weapons to protect himself against violence or theft, whether in his home
or elsewhere.25 Under the various “stand your ground” laws enacted postHeller, the individual now has the right to use that force regardless of whether
he has an opportunity to retreat.26 When coupled with the resulting stand your
ground laws, Heller essentially grants a right to privatize the policing function
of the civil state.
Viewed in social contract terms, this expansion of our constitutional rights
follows logically, if tragically, from the Supreme Court’s famous declaration in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services27 that the
individual has no constitutional right to expect, and the state has no duty to
provide, a police force.28 The state may be morally obligated to do so under the
terms of the social contract, as philosophers of the liberal state have understood
it. And it may even be highly desirable for the state to take that obligation upon
itself. But the state is under no constitutional duty to do so, and the individual
has no constitutional right to expect it. In Heller, the Court simply recognized
the consequences for the social contract recognized in dicta in DeShaney. If the
state is not constitutionally obligated to provide protection against private
violence, then the individual must be allowed to reclaim broad and natural
rights to lethal self-defense that he relinquished in exchange for that obligation.
imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from his assailant; (2) that he
in fact believed that he was in such danger; (3) that he did not provoke the conflict; and (4)
that the force used was neither unreasonable nor excessive. Roach v. State, 749 A.2d 787,
793 (Md. 2000).
24 See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 7, at 509.
25 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
26 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 704.1 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.972(1) (2009).
27 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-203 (1989).
28 Id. at 195 (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee
of certain minimal levels of safety and security.”).
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After Heller, then, the individual has the constitutional right to exit the social
compact. It is important to note, however, that the state breached first.
So what harm has this constitutional right done to civil society? After
DeShaney we have no constitutional right to a police force. We do, however,
have a natural right to defend ourselves – a right that many states have
broadened substantially through “stand your ground” laws. And after Heller
we now have a constitutional right to the weaponry necessary to exercise that
right to self-defense. Civil society is weakened when the scope of fully legal
lethal violence is broadened. Unsurprisingly, this travesty has led to not just an
increase in domestic violence,29 but also to a spate of high profile killings
deemed legal under stand your ground laws.30 The world that DeShaney and
Heller conceive is one in which the sovereign has given up its monopoly on
legal violence and abdicated its responsibility to protect the citizen against
private lethal aggression.
Heller is paradigmatic of the exit phenomenon I illustrate, but it is by no
means the only example. Protection against violence is not the sovereign’s
only obligation, nor is it civil society’s only core project. A second sovereign
obligation is education, as recognized by the Court in Brown,31 as declared by
virtually every state constitution,32 and as constantly reiterated by professional
educators and state leaders. Here as well, though, the Court has been quite
clear: Just as we do not have a constitutional right to a police force, likewise
we do not have a well-articulated constitutional right to a high quality public
education.33
What does the Constitution grant? If anything, arguably, it grants the right
only to a minimum level of education.34 Thus, in a development that parallels
the DeShaney-Heller arc, homeschooling advocates increasingly have urged
courts to identify not a right to a public education but a right to avoid one – not
a right to the benefits of this project so central to civil society, but a right to
exit it.35 Advocates of home schooling seek the right to pull their kids out of
29 For an argument that draws on Lockean and Hobbesian social contract theory to argue
that DeShaney is fundamentally confused on this point, see Laura Rae Dove, A
Constitutional Right to Police Protection and Classical Liberal Theory: Complement, Not
Conflict, 4 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 37, 61-68 (2013).
30 See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, at A1 (“In finding him not guilty of murder or
manslaughter, the jury agreed that Mr. Zimmerman could have been justified in shooting
Mr. Martin because he feared great bodily harm or death.”).
31 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
32 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1, cl. A; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; VA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1.
33 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194-203 (holding that there is no constitutional right to a police
force); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (finding no
constitutional right to education).
34 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
35 For a general discussion of the homeschooling movement and its legal underpinnings,
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public education and educate them at home, free from the oversight of public
educators, using curricular material of their own making or bought online from
for-profit cyber “charter schools.”36 Although not yet judicially recognized,
this claimed constitutional “right to home school” clearly exists in the realm of
popular constitutionalism: advocates press for it, courts are leaning toward it,
parents expect it, state legislatures increasingly acknowledge it, and cashstarved school boards act as though it already exists.37 Parents’ seek this right,
more often than not, out of a profound and genuine desire, backed by religious
belief, to exit virtually all “public” aspects of society’s education project.
Theirs is a desire not to participate in, and not to subject their children to,
public schools that are open to all, funded with tax dollars, and staffed by
professional educators who aim to instill norms of tolerance and liberalism, all
toward the goal of educating future citizens. The homeschooling community,
or at least the best organized part of it, seeks quite explicitly to exit this
intergenerational social compact, by which one generation funds the education
of the next in the interest of building a strong civil society. Their legal
advocates and the occasional lower court have articulated the contours of a
constitutional right to home schooling, under the First Amendment’s free
exercise clause, the substantive due process prong of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or both. Whatever the textual backing, the logic and rhetoric is
that of exit: Parents should have the right to exit this core feature of the social
contract and core function of the state in civil society.
see Rob Reich, On Regulating Homeschooling: A Reply to Glanzer, 58 EDUC. THEORY 17
(2008); Rob Reich, Why Homeschooling Should Be Regulated, in HOMESCHOOLING IN FULL
VIEW 109 (Bruce S. Cooper ed., 2005); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education off the Grid:
Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (2008). For an
example of the inclination of courts to recognize something like a right to homeschool, see
Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
36 For a full discussion of the online curricula used by the homeschooling movement, see
DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR 180-97 (2013).
37 In In re Rachel L., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), a California appellate
court refused to entertain an argument that the California Constitution granted parents a
constitutional right to homeschool their children. As the court explained:
The trial court’s reason for declining to order public or private schooling for the
children was its belief that parents have a constitutional right to school their children in
their own home. However, California courts have held that under provisions in the
Education Code, parents do not have a constitutional right to home school their
children. Thus, while the petition for extraordinary writ asserts that the trial court’s
refusal to order attendance in a public or private school was an abuse of discretion, we
find the refusal was actually an error of law.
Id. at 79.
After a three month period of statewide revolt, the court reversed itself, holding that there
is such a right based on the California Constitution and California state law, and strongly
suggested the existence of a federal constitutional right as well. Jonathan L., 81 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 592 (holding that parents have “a constitutional liberty interest in directing the
education of their children” that can only be overridden by a compelling state interest).
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The blossoming right to homeschool and the now established right to bear
arms – the former a part of the “popular constitution,” and the latter a part of
the adjudicated one – are the most visible and most significant of the new
generation of exit rights. But they are by no means the only ones. Recently,
catholic churches, hospitals, and schools have sought “exemptions” from not
only the various mandates of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), but also the
obligations imposed on employers by the Civil Rights Acts, on the ground that
those acts violate these institutions’ First Amendment rights to free expression
or free speech. On this theory the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC granted church affiliated
employers far ranging “ministerial exemptions” from the mandates of the Civil
Rights Acts, giving them the power to fire, hire, and promote any employee
whom they designate a “minister” free from the constraints of the
antidiscrimination norm at the heart of those laws.38 The Catholic Church has
long enjoyed a blanket exemption from those acts in order to retain its right to
an all male priesthood.39 But increasingly, secular employers, citing
conscience-based objections, have sought similar exemptions from the
insurance mandate in the ACA.40 The textual bases of these various
“conscience exemptions” differ, but common among them is a deeper impulse
to recognize a right to exit the obligations imposed by popular legislation
intended to safeguard the individual’s right, regardless of gender, race, or
disability, to participate in employment and education free from
discrimination.
Using logic that is strikingly similar to that employed in the context of
challenges to the ACA mandates, the Court has also found that public-sector
unions that represent member and nonmember workers alike in collective
bargaining activities cannot require objecting nonmembers to pay special fees
for the purpose of financing the union’s political and ideological activities.41
Justice Roberts implies in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius that individuals can exempt themselves (albeit at the cost of paying a
tax) from an obligation to purchase insurance that not only facilitates, but is
essential to, a public health project.42 Moreover, states have a constitutional
exit right to refuse to expand their poorer citizens’ access to health care, as

38 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 710 (2012) (“The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”).
39 See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1168 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying “ministerial exception” to bar a Title VII claim for gender
discrimination).
40 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
41 See, e.g., Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291-96
(2012).
42 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-91 (2012).
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required by the law.43 In a long and complex body of law, courts have found
that employers and sellers have various rights contractually to opt out of the
obligations that tort, contract, and consumer law otherwise impose, by
contracting with their employees or purchasers to arbitrate any disputes.44
Today’s exit rights paradigm did not come out of nowhere; it has a
decidedly liberal, Warren Court-Berger Court pedigree. Decisions treasured by
liberals of all stripes and of a somewhat older vintage grant substantive due
process rights to avoid the obligations pressed upon citizens to respect life and
the moral demands imposed by a community reflected in its laws. Thus
pregnant women can “exit” their pregnancies, at least in the first trimester and
so long as they pay for the abortion, exiting both their biological relation with
an unwelcome fetus and their relation with a moralistic legislature seeking to
ensure that they maintain that relation.45 Dying persons can similarly exit their
lives, to some degree, exiting not only their own life but also civil relations
with their caretakers, relatives, and co-citizens.46 The same logic of exit from
civil society or civil projects is foreshadowed in these older cases. Thus,
although we do not have constitutional rights to health care, assistance with
parenting obligations, or a livable family wage – a proposition so obvious that
the Court has never even had occasion state it – we do have a constitutional
right to exit family obligations we cannot afford through abortion. Likewise,
we do not have a constitutional right to hospice care, but we do have – at least
according to the consensus among liberal constitutionalists – a right to die
when our pain becomes unbearable.47 For several decades now, Amish families
have enjoyed the right to be entirely free of the duty to educate their teenagers,
either in public or private or home schools.48 And religious families since the

43

Id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the
Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States
accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to
do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away
their existing Medicaid funding.”).
44 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (striking down a
California judicial rule regarding the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in
consumer contracts on the grounds that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the rule).
45 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that the state may not regulate a
pregnant woman’s decision to have an abortion during “the stage prior to approximately the
end of the first trimester”).
46 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (upholding Oregon’s physician-assisted
suicide statute based on “the structure and limitations of federalism, which allow the States
‘great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs,
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons’”).
47 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41 (discussing Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858,
96-110), 1996 WL 708956).
48 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972).
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twenties have had the right to educate their children in private religious schools
and schools that immerse their children in languages other than English.49 In
these early education cases, as in the modern homeschooling cases, there are
no rights to, but there are robust rights out of, civic education. All of these
older liberal rights, in various ways, permitted or encouraged exit, whether
from pregnancy, from family, from life itself, from public education, from
secular influences, or from the English speaking community. And all of these
valorized liberal rights form the precedential background of today’s decidedly
illiberal exit rights: the much more modern rights to exit the social project of
policing, of education in toto, of antidiscrimination, of public health, and so on.
All of these exit rights – both the older liberal ones and the newer libertarian
ones – tolerate, permit, or overtly encourage exit from projects central to and
maybe constitutive of civil society: a publicly funded police force, responsible
to and for the community’s safety; public education, paid for by tax dollars and
staffed by professional public educators who teach a core of knowledge and
critical thought essential for eventual public citizenship; parentage itself, its
obligations, and the community’s moral consensus that values it; health care
for the elderly and sick, including obligations of hospice, paid for by insurance
to which we all contribute; access to courts and to a common law for the
redress for private wrongs; and fair labor and compensation in workplaces,
ensured by a unionized labor force. Individuals now have constitutional rights
to exit virtually all of these social projects.50 And while they have roots in a
handful of substantive due process cases that go back a century, their
proliferation today is a decidedly contemporary phenomenon. They do not
merely recognize the right to individual liberty. Rather, they identify separate
spheres within which a state’s freely acknowledged sovereign power simply
does not reach. The individual homeowner is sovereign, with sovereign powers
of violence both in his home and around his “ground” on which he “stands.”
The Church and its employers are sovereign, free of the obligations imposed
by Congress not discriminate on the basis of suspect characteristics. The
employer whose conscience is bothered is free of the obligation to comply with
an insurance mandate or a civil rights law. The healthy individual is free of the
obligation to purchase an insurance contract. The nonmember worker is free of
the obligation to pay dues earmarked for political activity to the union that
protects his bargaining power. The fundamentalist parent arguably has the right
to exit the obligations as well as the web of rights of public education. Of

49

Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 53436 (1925).
50 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (Medicaid
expansion); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291-96 (2012)
(union fees); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (litigation);
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-203 (1989) (police
force); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (public
education); Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (parentage).
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somewhat older vintage, but of some consequence in this regard, pregnant
women and dying citizens have the right to sever the bonds of civic association
as well as earthly coils, through exercising constitutionally protected choices.
Exit rights are fast becoming a central, if not the central, paradigm of
constitutional meaning.
The damage exit rights do to civil society is not insubstantial and cannot
easily be quantified. Critical legal scholars and civic republicans have not
successfully articulated this damage in their rights critiques. The problem is
not that exit rights insulate subordination or inequality in a private sphere –
although many of them do that – or that they tear at communitarian bonds –
although most do. Rather, the distinctive harm done by the proliferation of exit
rights is to both the reality and the aspiration of e pluribus unum. They create,
in its stead, an aspiration, and to some degree a reality, of e pluribus pluribus.
From many comes many. Many views may proliferate as to what the
conscience requires with respect to discriminatory hiring practices. Many
individuals may have access to legal and utterly lethal force because we have
not collectively delegated that power to a central sovereign whom we all
endow with a monopoly on legal violence. We need not work toward a core
curriculum that recognizes an education required of all our children that will
prepare them for the future. Instead we can educate our children independently
toward individualized educational goals, not for citizenship in a civic society,
but for, say, membership in a Kingdom of God, or a community of believers.
We have constitutional rights, in other words, to defy the pull of our
conscience or our obligation to civil society. By the light of these decisions,
that is now what it means to be a rights-holding American.
II.

RIGHTS TO ENTER

The heart of e pluribus pluribus, though, is not rights and not “individual
rights.” The problem is the relatively new proliferation of constitutionally
grounded exit rights. Obviously, though, not all rights are “rights to exit,” or
even trend that way. One type of right, furthermore, is the diametrical opposite.
Civil rights, virtually by definition, are not exit rights. At their core, and for
good reason, civil rights have been called rights of participation, rights of
inclusion, rights of membership, or most tellingly, rights of belonging. For my
purposes, civil rights are rights to enter civil society – the same civil society
from which all of our newfound Constitutional rights guarantee exit.
According to Tom Paine’s iconic essay, Rights of Man, civil rights are those
natural rights we enjoy by virtue not only of our humanity – this is true of all
natural rights – but by virtue of our membership in society.51 Moreover, unlike
some of our more familiar natural rights, such as rights to the mind, to
conscience, or to freedom of action, Paine argued that civil rights are those
rights we cannot enforce without the aid of the law, state, and civil society.52
51
52

PAINE, supra note 12, at 68.
Id.
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According to Paine, civil rights have three defining attributes: they are (1)
natural rights (2) that arise by virtue of one’s membership in society, and (3)
that cannot be enforced or protected on their own. They are, in modern
parlance, natural and positive rights of societal membership; they are rights to
law, rather than rights to be free of law. They are rights to enjoy access to those
laws and social institutions that facilitate the full enjoyment of a flourishing
life. Civil rights are, in other words, rights to enter civil society. By virtue of
our antidiscrimination law, those rights cannot be denied to any person on the
basis of race, sex, disability and so on. Antidiscrimination law protects our
equal enjoyment of our civil rights. The civil rights thus protected, however,
are those rights to enter and then fully participate in civil life.
And what are they? What are those natural rights we enjoy by virtue of
membership in society, and which we cannot enforce on our own? Let me first
answer the question positivistically by briefly listing those positive civil rights
won over time. To the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, those civil
rights of protection, which cannot be denied on the basis of prior enslavement,
included rights to contract, own property, write a will, and sue on account of
injury.53 The Enforcement Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act) added to that list
the right to be protected against private violence such as lynchings.54 The
constitutionally doomed Civil Rights Act of 1875 famously added to the list
the rights to enjoy public accommodations and transportation.55 According to
modern historians, in the 1930s and 1940s “civil rights” primarily denoted
labor rights, including the right to safe and well-compensated labor, and
eventually, the right to unionize and strike.56 By mid-century, and by virtue of

53 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (“[S]uch citizens, of every race
and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . .
shall have the same right . . . to make and endorse contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property . . . .”).
54 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1878 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012) (providing a cause of
action against private parties who conspire to “depriv[e], either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws”).
55 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 336, held unconstitutional by The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (discussing rights to “full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land
or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement”).
56 William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 59-60
(1999) (“Workers’ rights to associate, assemble, unionize, and strike constituted First,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims repeatedly spurned by the courts that labor
brought again and again to Congress and state legislatures. . . . Finally, in the ‘30s, Congress
embraced much of labor’s exiled interpretations of the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments . . . .”); Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of
Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609, 1669-74 (2001) (discussing the “centrality of labor” to
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a civil rights movement that eventually led to the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, our civil rights included rights to nondiscriminatory education57
and employment opportunities.58 All of these civil rights fit well within Paine’s
understanding of civil rights. Civil rights to contract, property, and so forth are
grounded in natural rights, but they are also clearly rights we have by virtue of
membership in society and which we can enjoy only insofar as the state
enforces them. And the same is true of rights to employment and educational
opportunities, public transportation and so on. All of these rights are “rights to
enter” some aspect of civil society – be it commerce, education, employment,
or some public space, such as theatres, public transportation, and
accommodations – and all of them depend on positive law for their full
perfection.
The last third of the twentieth century and the first two decades of this one,
have seen a major expansion of our civil rights to enter. We have extended our
civil rights to enter to groups heretofore excluded, for example through the
Age Discrimination and Americans with Disabilities Acts,59 and possibly the
Equal Employment Act as well. And, at the same time, we have expanded our
conception of the civil society to which civil rights protect entrance.
Consequently, today our civil rights include a host of familial rights, such as
the right to be protected against domestic violence60 and the right to not be
deprived of a job by virtue of our caregiving responsibilities.61 They also
include the right to a quality education regardless of poverty or disability.62
Most recently, our civil rights have come to include, at least arguably, rights to
health insurance and to the health care that such insurance facilitates, rights to
marry whomever we love, regardless of gender or sexual orientation, and rights
to immigrate on fair and humane conditions.63
Department of Justice’s definition of civil rights in the late 1930s and 1940s, id. at 1669).
57 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
58 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012).
59 Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6106, 6106a, 6107 (2012);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
60 Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
61 Family Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 and 29 U.S.C.).
62 See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§
14005-14006, 123 Stat. 115, 282; No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110,
115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2012)).
63 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-20a (West Supp. 2013) (codifying the right to marriage for opposite- and
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All of these contemporary civil rights fit Paine’s definition: they are all
natural rights grounded in our nature, but which we are owed by virtue of our
membership in society. And we cannot enforce them on our own without the
aid of the state, a considerable body of enabling law, civil society, and civil
society’s institutions. We enjoy the fruits of our contracts because of the law
that enables us to contract at all, not because of a natural instinct to bargain.
We cannot contract, own property, or write a will without contract law,
property law, and estate law. We cannot acquire a quality education without a
healthy dollop of law, pedagogy, administration and regulation; without law
and educational institutions only a very few of us would discern those lovely
Pythagorean theorems all on our own. We cannot labor fairly and freely
without the wind of employment law and its enabling institutions at our back;
our labor otherwise would be soul numbing and exploitative. We cannot enjoy
a long and healthy life without the protections accorded by law and medicine,
without them, our lives would be nasty and short, if not brutal. And we cannot
enjoy a safe life – that is, physical security – either in our communities or in
our homes, without the protection of the state against the private violence that
disables it. These civil rights provide access to civil society, which we could
not possibly enjoy without law: they are the rights to the law, legal institutions,
and social structures that define the spheres of civil life.
Paine added one final definitional claim, in his brief but fecund discussion
of the various differences between natural and civil rights. The right to
protection by the state against private violence – the civil right to physical
security – he argued, is the quintessential civil right.64 It is owed to us by virtue
of our membership in society, and it is not susceptible to enforcement by
anyone on his own. To take those in order: A safe and long life is, in Sen and
Nussbaum’s compelling language, a natural “capability,” the enjoyment of
which is central to “human flourishing.”65 But the right we have to the
protection of our security so that we can enjoy that natural capability, is held
not by virtue of our humanity, but by virtue of our membership in society. It is
a right that any liberal state must protect, in Sen and Nussbaum’s modern
formulation of exactly the same idea. Moreover, it is one that we clearly cannot
enforce on our own: self-help alone will not keep any of us safe, as Hobbes
understood all too well. We need the state. We need the positive protection of
the law. With that protection, we can expect a safe life of ordinary duration,
uninterrupted by private violence. We have, then, a civil right to the state’s
protection against civil violence. With it, we enter civil society and as an equal.

same-sex couples); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2013)
(same); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (2012 & Supp. 2013) (same).
64 PAINE, supra note 12, at 68.
65 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 148 (2001); Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE
30, 31 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
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Without it, either we are slaves to whomever has legal violent power over us or
we are out in the cold.
The centrality of the civil right to the state’s protection against private
violence is a constant thread in our various civil rights laws and traditions,
spanning two centuries. It finds poignant but emphatic expression in the Ku
Klux Klan Enforcement Act of 1871: freed slaves must have a right to the
state’s protection against lynchings and other conspiracies of violence in order
to fully and equally participate in, or enter, civil society.66 If the state militia
will not provide it, then the national government must. To be subject to private
violence that is unchecked by the state is to be subject to another master and
hence denied equal membership; it is to be thrust back into a state of effective
slavery. The same insight is echoed a century later in the Violence Against
Women Act. Victims of domestic abuse must be protected against intimate
violence, if they are to enjoy equal and full citizenship.67 State protection
against civil violence – recognized by the drafters of both acts over a hundred
years apart – is a if not the fundamental civil right; it is the right on which
participation in civil society is fundamentally dependent. Anyone deprived of
that right is denied entrance. Anyone subject to unchecked private violence is
outside the sphere of the law’s protection.
We have a civil right to protection by the state against private violence. In
exchange, we relinquish our natural right to self-help. We have a constitutional
right, though, to exit just that contract, and take up our own arms toward the
same end. The exit right threatens the civil right. The same is true of civil
society writ large: we have civil rights to enter civil society and we have
constitutional rights to exit it. Again the latter threaten the former. The threat,
however, while serious, clearly does not stem from the very idea of rights, or
even individual rights. The threat to both civil society and the civil rights that
protect our rights to enter it comes from our recently constitutionalized rights
to exit.
CONCLUSION
Let me sum up and then draw one moral. During roughly the same period
that our Courts have constructed various constitutional rights to exit the
obligations, burdens, and even the benefits of civil society, Congress, and to a
lesser but still meaningful extent, state legislatures, have created a variety of
civil rights to enter it. These rights are in considerable tension. We have no
constitutional right to a police force, courtesy of DeShaney,68 but we do have a
civil right, emanating from a social compact and recognized in a host of civil
rights laws over two centuries, to the state’s protection against violence, in
exchange for our forbearance of self-help. Perhaps they would be in equipoise,
66

Ku Klux Klan Act of 1878 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012).
Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
68 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
67
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but for this: we also have had now for over a decade a constitutional right to
own and use a gun – including in lethal acts of self-defense. So, we now have a
constitutional right to exit the social compact from which the civil right to
protection by the state against private violence is derived. Similarly, we do not
have a constitutional right to a high quality public education, at least none that
the Courts, rather than commentators, have seen fit to articulate. But we do
have a civil right to one, again emanating from an inter-generational social
compact. And, the state clearly has an obligation to provide it, in exchange for
our duty to support and participate in it, as recognized in most state
constitutions, in a host of federal laws from NCLB to IDEA to RTTT, and by
the Supreme Court itself in Brown v Board of Education. Again, perhaps these
would be in equipoise, but for this: We also have, according to some dicta in
court opinions and highly impactful public advocacy, a constitutional exit right
to quit the social compact that gives rise to the civil right. We may have a
right, that is, to take our kids out of public schools and homeschool them. We
do not have a constitutional right to nondiscrimination in the private sphere,
although we obviously have civil rights to nondiscrimination in the private
sphere, as codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Yet here as elsewhere over
the last few years, the courts have drawn ever broadening constitutional exit
rights, by which some employers can avoid the burdens of nondiscrimination
law, if the employer’s corporate conscience is at odds with policy that emerges
from the democratic process that is part and parcel with the social compact.
We have no constitutional right to health or to health care, although we do
have a very precarious civil right to one, regardless of our ability to pay. That
civil right is the product of as clear a social compact as one can imagine: a
contract by which healthy and sick, young and old, jointly undertake a public
health project by pooling and spreading risks of disease, accident, and
advanced age. As the young will one day be old and the healthy will one day
be sick, all are burdened, but all are benefited. But the healthy individual might
have a constitutional exit right to refuse to buy the health insurance that would
facilitate that care, and states quite clearly have a constitutional right to refuse
to extend the health care to its poorer citizens that stems most directly from the
social compact – Medicaid. We have no constitutional right to a job, much less
one that pays well and can be performed in safe conditions, although perhaps
we should have a civil right to just that. But we apparently have a
constitutional right to refuse to support with dues a union that represents us in
attempts to secure one. And so forth. Our civil rights are more often than not to
benefits derived from civil society and from the social compact that is at its
heart – benefits, however, that are not protected by constitutional rights. Our
newest generation of constitutional rights – exit rights – give individuals and
corporations rights to exit the obligations and forego the rights derived from
that compact and the civil society arises from that compact.
What to do, if we care about these rights, and the civil society they
structure? The lack of constitutional rights to health, to safety, to education, to
fair labor, to nondiscrimination and so forth is obviously detrimental to civil
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society, but it is also obviously not fatal. And the Constitution, while it does
not grant these positive rights, clearly does not forbid Congress from granting
them. The new generation of exit rights the courts have fashioned, however, do
have the potential to unravel civil society, depending on the extent to which
they are embraced. Obviously, if enough healthy individuals exercise their
constitutional right to not buy health insurance, the ACA is threatened. If
enough homeowners and individuals arm themselves, and exercise their
constitutional rights to lethal self-defense, the safety we garner by virtue of our
publicly funded police force is badly compromised. If too many parents pull
their children from the public schools and school them at home, the fiscal
solvency of public schools and the citizen-focused norms of liberalism and
tolerance integral to the public curriculum are undermined. More generally,
and more rhetorically, if we accept the understanding of American identity, of
constitutionalism, and of individualism at the heart of these rights of exit, their
potency is magnified. If we accept an understanding of ourselves as
fundamentally entitled, by virtue of the Constitution we have all sworn to
uphold and all citizens are taught to revere, to exit from fundamental social
projects, then not only those projects, but the idea of civil society itself, is
seriously eroded.
The constitutional rights tradition, however, is not the only “rights tradition”
game in town. It is not the only understanding of rights available to us. Civil
rights are also a part of our history. They differ in some obvious and
compelling ways. They have a dramatically different pedigree: civil rights,
unlike constitutional rights, are (mostly, not entirely) a product of democracy
rather than a constraint on it. They respect community, not just individuality,
and they rest on a cooperative rather than competitive understanding of our
contractual and quasi-contractual relations with our co-citizens. Most crucially,
though, civil rights have a fundamentally different point: civil rights, unlike
constitutional rights, invite participation in our civil society rather than threaten
its demise. They have from the beginning been motivated by both norms of
humanity and social inclusion. They protect and respect community rather than
a relentless and often damaging individualism, and they structure and animate
our civil society rather than target it.
My prescriptive suggestion is that if we value American civil society we
should take a break from our constitutional rights tradition and renew our
commitment to civil rights. Civil rights define a set of traditions and an ethical
way of thinking and being that is worth understanding, deepening, and
extending. If we could attend to our civil rights with the same meticulous
scholarly, political, and ethical care we have devoted lately to constitutional
rights and constitutionalism, we would likely find the beginnings of a path out
of our currently dysfunctional morass. We could start, for example, by
insisting that the quest for sensible gun legislation is a defining civil rights
issue of our time, and not just a matter of good policy. We could articulate the
content and boundaries of our civil rights to a high quality public education,
decent jobs, and health care. Were we to do this, we would to some extent at
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least even the playing field: the rights to homeschool, to “at will employment,”
to not buy insurance, to opt out of union dues and nondiscrimination
obligations, and to own and fire a gun would all have counters in rights, rather
than only in the always somewhat ominous sounding “police powers” of the
state. Rights to health, education, labor, safety and so on do, of course,
emanate from the state’s police powers, and of course the state should employ
that power toward good policy objectives. But they also emanate from our
humanity and our membership in civil society, and they are rights we simply
cannot enforce on our own. As such, they reflect, originate in, and ground civil
society and the compacts at its core. When we neglect them, we neglect their
fruit – the seeds of democracy.
This is, of course, only a partial answer to the problem of a dysfunctional
Congress. It addresses the civil society part of the “perfect storm” that besets
our government and that Yasmin Dawood describes so well.69 But it is, I
believe, a part of the answer. If we are going to redress the civil society deficit,
one way to do it is through a reinvigorated commitment to our civil rights
traditions. We should not hesitate to do so because we have over-read the
import of the rights critiques of the last thirty years. Rights themselves are not
the problem. Rights that target civil society and the social compact – and do so
in the name of the Constitution – are.

69 Yasmin Dawood, Democratic Dysfunction and Constitutional Design, 94 B.U. L. REV.
913 (2014).

